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HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: STILL CONFUSED AFTER
ALL THESE YEARS
Shobha Varughese George
"The purpose of sovereign immunity in modem international law is
not to protect the sensitivities of 19th-century monarchs or the pre-
rogatives of the 20th-century state."'
INTRODUCTION
The United States State Department made this declaration almost
two decades ago as it advocated a statute to govern foreign sovereign
immunity law? The resulting statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 ("FSIA"),3 limits the prerogatives of the twentieth-
century state by enumerating specific exceptions to a foreign state's
right to immunity As a whole, the FSIA embodies a restrictive the-
ory of immunity which mandates that "immunity would attach only to
inherently governmental or 'public' acts of a state."' 5
Although the FSIA covers sovereign immunity, the statute is silent
regarding head-of-state immunity, which is derived from sovereign im-
munity. Having originally also protected the sensitivities of nine-
teenth-century monarchs, sovereign immunity separated from head-
of-state immunity as twentieth-century states developed identities dis-
tinct from their heads-of-state. Although heads-of-state are no longer
equated with the state itself, head-of-state immunity and sovereign
immunity share a common tradition and similar goals. In the United
States courts, however, head-of-state immunity is still mired in prac-
tices that sovereign immunity has long since abandoned.
The United States courts have recently seen a pronounced increase
in litigation involving heads-of-state.6 These cases generally involve
1. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.A.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law, and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 27 (1976) [hereinafter States
Hearings] (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State).
2. At that time, foreign sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-state were
considered one and the same. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988).
4. See infra note 63 and accompanying text for a list of the specific exceptions to
immunity.
5. Chuidian v. Philippine Natl Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990). For a
further discussion of restrictive immunity, see infra notes 44-50 and accompanying
text.
6. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Case Note, 88 Am. J. Int'l L 528,531 & nn.16 & 18
(1994) (citing, among others, Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd
mem., sub nor. Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1989);
Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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heads-of-state accused of violating the law in either private or com-
mercial acts outside the scope of their official duties.7 In the absence
of clear statutory guidance, courts have deferred to State Department
"suggestions" of immunity, or, in the absence of such determinations,
solved the problem under existing statutory or case law.8
Two recent examples show the courts' adoption of divergent ap-
proaches to head-of-state immunity claims, which have led commenta-
tors to speculate that this immunity is currently "at best [an]
amorphous legal doctrine whose very existence is not entirely settled
in U.S. law and whose reach is almost completely uncertain." 9
Lafontant v. Aristide'° was a suit in a New York district court by the
widow of an imprisoned political opponent killed by Haitian soldiers
allegedly acting on the orders of then-President of Haiti, Jean-Ber-
trande Aristide. 11 Aristide was living in exile in the United States at
the time of the suit.2 The State Department, intervening on behalf of
Aristide, issued a letter to the court suggesting immunity.13 The court
found the State Department's suggestion of immunity binding and dis-
missed the case against Aristide. 4
The court reasoned that the FSIA does not apply to head-of-state
immunity because the statute was "crafted primarily to allow state-
owned companies ... to be sued in United States courts in connection
7. See, e.g., Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986) (involving
an injunction against former president of the Philippines, Marcos, and his wife to
prevent them from transferring or encumbering property in New York), cert. dis-
missed, sub nom. Ancor Holdings, N.V. v. Republic of the Phil., 480 U.S. 942 (1987);
Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. CIV.A.H-93-4169, 1994 WL 447620 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 10, 1994) (involving a suit against the King of Saudi Arabia, among others,
for false imprisonment); Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (involving
a suit against the wife of the President of Mexico for false imprisonment), aff'd mem.,
sub nom. Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1989).
8. See infra part II.
9. Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 531.
10. 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
11. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 130-31.
12. Id. at 130. During this time, the U.S. government continued to recognize Aris-
tide as the legitimate leader of Haiti. Id. "[D]espite having been in exile for more
than two years before the decision ... [t]he court was bound by the continuing recog-
nition by the executive branch of the defendant as the President of Haiti; the nonrec-
ognition of the military government in Haiti precluded giving effect to any purported
waiver of Aristide's immunity by that government." Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 528-
29.
13. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 131. Suggesting immunity means the State Depart-
ment has assessed the situation and has filed a determination favoring immunity in
the court where the case is pending. See Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mem., sub nom. Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App.
Div. 1989); see also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
14. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 139. Even though the U.S. government still recog-
nized Aristide as the legitimate head-of-state of Haiti and may have had a political
interest in granting Aristide immunity, this fact does not alter the basic premise of this
Note that heads-of-state should not be immunized for acts outside the scope of their
authority.
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with their commercial activities."' 5 Therefore, the court held that
common law head-of-state immunity and the State Department's pro-
cedure of issuing "suggestions" of immunity are still in effect.16 The
pre-FSIA approach to foreign sovereign immunity for states as well as
heads-of-state required the courts to defer to executive determina-
tions of immunity because the executive branch has exclusive author-
ity in conducting foreign affairs.17
Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos)8 similarly involved a claim
against a foreign head-of-state who was exiled to the United States
after having fallen from grace in his home country." The families of
people who had been tortured and executed in the Philippines alleg-
edly under the authority of then-President of the Philippines, Ferdi-
nand Marcos, brought suit against him in California. 0 Unlike the
Aristide court, the Marcos court did not even specifically address
head-of-state immunity, rather analyzing this case against a former
head-of-state under the rubric of sovereign immunity21 In the ab-
sence of any State Department recommendation, the court asserted
jurisdiction and held Marcos' estate liable for the human rights
violations32
The court's reasoning followed an earlier line of cases in which the
Ninth Circuit had determined that acts of individual officials could be
considered that of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
within the meaning of FSIA."'  In a previous case, the Ninth Circuit
had applied the FSIA term to both individuals and organizations act-
ing in their official capacity as employees of a foreign sovereign be-
cause the statute did not explicitly prohibit their inclusion.24 The
Marcos court reasoned that because Marcos's alleged human rights
violations were not official acts, they did not receive immunity under
the FSIA.25
The Aristide court and the Ninth Circuit, therefore, have different
perspectives regarding not only the extent to which immunity should
be granted, but also the comprehensiveness of the FSIA. The Aristide
court, determined that the FSIA applies only to sovereign immunity
and that the pre-FSIA approach of absolute immunity at the behest of
the executive branch still applies to head-of-state immunity. This
15. Id at 137.
16. Id. at 139.
17. Id. at 132-33.
18. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
19. Id. at 1469.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 1468-72.
22. Id. at 1472. Although Marcos had died a few years previously, the court con-
cluded the plaintiffs' claim survived his death. Id. at 1476.
23. Id. at 1470 (citation omitted).
24. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
25. In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1472.
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method involving executive discretion, however, greatly politicizes
grants of immunity. In addition, a coherent body of case law concern-
ing head-of-state immunity cannot form through ad hoc determina-
tions by both the executive and judicial branches. The Ninth Circuit,
on the other hand, has determined that the FSIA applies to individu-
als and, consequently, heads-of-state. Although the Ninth Circuit is
correct in restricting head-of-state immunity and State Department
discretion, applying the FSIA as written to heads-of-state deviates
from the plain language of the statute as well as congressional intent.
This Note argues that implementing a restrictive immunity for a
foreign head-of-state's public acts through an amendment to the FSIA
would resolve the current confusion regarding head-of-state immu-
nity. The FSIA has established comprehensive rules governing sover-
eign immunity 6 and is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction in the
United States courts over a foreign state in the specifically enumer-
ated instances27 where immunity is not granted. 8 The amendment
this Note proposes would consist primarily of including a definitional
provision for the term "heads-of-state." The established statutory
framework of the FSIA would then encompass head-of-state
immunity.29
Although this Note concludes that neither private nor commercial
acts of a current or former head of state should receive immunity, the
application of this immunity will primarily focus on the commercial
context.30 Consequently, the focus of the immunity's inquiry will shift
from whether the head-of-state is in power to the nature of the dis-
puted act.3 '
Part I of this Note surveys the history of head-of-state immunity.
Although head-of-state immunity and sovereign immunity were his-
torically the same, sovereign immunity diverged from head-of-state
immunity after the enactment of the FSIA and became a clear, statu-
torily-defined phenomenon.
26. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 495 n.22 (1983).
27. The FSIA does not grant immunity in specifically enumerated instances such
as where the foreign actor is involved in commercial activities. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1605(a)(1)-(4), (b) (1988).
28. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
29. For example, the federal courts would have sole jurisdiction over head-of-state
immunity and the immunity would be subject to the exceptions enumerated in the
FSIA.
30. Private acts generally mean either human rights violations or criminal acts.
The application of head-of-state immunity to such acts has already been discussed in
other articles. For examples of such articles, see Tom Lininger, Overcoming Immunity
Defenses to Human Rights Suits in U.S. Courts, 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 177 (1994) and
Charles E. Hickey, Note, The Dictator, Drugs and Diplomacy by Indictment: Head-
of-State Immunity in United States v. Noriega, 4 Conn. J. Int'l L. 729 (1989).
31. Currently, former heads-of-state usually do not receive immunity for either
their public or private acts. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Note presents the case law reflecting the current split
in authority indicated by the Aristidea2 and Marcos 3 decisions. Fur-
thermore, it presents judicial and scholarly critiques of both
approaches.
Part III of this Note suggests that the United States should imple-
ment restrictive immunity for heads-of-state similar to that governing
sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Restrictive immunity will be ap-
plied in the increasingly international commercial context. This Note
also argues that restrictive immunity should be implemented through
an amendment to the FSIA that clearly includes heads-of-states as de-
termined by a head-of-state list created in accordance with the statute.
Finally, this part demonstrates through hypothetical examples the
method by which the proposed system will operate in practice. This
Note concludes that head-of-state immunity would be better served by
statutory clarification than by the current common law approach.
I. THm HISTORY AND DOCTRINE OF HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY
Head-of-state immunity in the United States is a recent phenome-
non. Although the specifics of this immunity are not yet established,
courts and scholars have discussed the immunity's rationale and
scope.
A. The History of Head-of-State Immunity
The history of foreign sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-
state are linked in customary international law. Indeed, both immuni-
ties were considered one and the same before the enactment of the
FSJA. Consequently, any discussion of head-of-state immunity neces-
sarily implicates a basic understanding of sovereign state immunity
and the FSIA.
1. Both Sovereign Immunity for States and Heads-of-State
Originated in Customary International Law
Head-of-state immunity is a principle of customary international
law,' requiring that a "head of state [be] immune from the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign state's courts, at least as to authorized official acts
taken while the ruler is in power.135 Along with the doctrines of sov-
32. 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
33. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. CL 934 (1995).
34. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1990); see gener-
ally Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving The Confilsion Over Head of State Immunity:
The Defined Right of Kings, 86 Colum. L Rev. 169, 170 (1986) (tracing the historical
development of head-of-state immunity).
35. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th Cir.) (cita-
tions omitted), cert denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); see also Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1519
(stating that a head-of-state is not subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts for "acts
taken during the ruler's term of office" (citation omitted)).
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ereign immunity,3 6 diplomatic immunity, 37 and the Act of State doc-
trine,3 the United States courts recognize head-of-state immunity as
immunizing a foreign actor's actions.39
Historically, sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-state im-
munity were considered one and the same40 because the head-of-state
was considered to be the equivalent of the state.41 Following the en-
actment of the FSIA, a substantive immunity for foreign heads-of-
state separate from the doctrine of sovereign immunity came into
existence.42 Since the plain language of the FSIA did not cover sover-
eign immunity for heads-of-state, the courts fashioned a separate im-
munity to cover this concept. Currently, the doctrines are generally
treated as separate.43
2. Pre-FSIA Executive "Suggestions" of Immunity
In another twentieth century development, the United States
changed from applying an absolute theory of foreign sovereign immu-
nity to a restrictive view of immunity. 44 Under an absolute theory of
36. Under sovereign immunity, "a foreign state is presumptively immune from thejurisdiction of United States courts...." Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 1476
(1993) (discussing sovereign immunity as defined by the FSIA).
37. Diplomatic immunity grants immunity from lawsuits to diplomats in host
countries. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3240, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
Although heads-of-state in the United States may invoke diplomatic immunity,
they have traditionally preferred to rely on "suggestions" of immunity from the State
Department. Peter E. Bass, Note, Ex-Head of State Immunity: A Proposed Statutory
Tool of Foreign Policy, 97 Yale L. J. 299, 302 n.14 (1987). For an explanation of the
State Department procedure involved in "suggestions" of immunity see infra note 51.
38. The Act of State Doctrine bars U.S. courts from reviewing the official acts of a
foreign government. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 443 (1987). Courts have decided head-of-state cases based on the Act of
State Doctrine. See Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (finding
that the Act of State Doctrine precluded an action against ex-President Marcos who
was acting in his official capacity as head-of-state). The Act of State Doctrine usually
affords little protection to heads-of-state since the courts have limited its application.
See Lininger, supra note 30, at 188-89 nn.75-79. The Act of State Doctrine and sover-
eign/head-of-state immunity have developed separately and remain distinct.
39. See generally Lininger, supra note 30, at 182, 185-86 (listing sovereign immu-
nity, Act of State doctrine, head-of-state immunity, and diplomatic immunity).
40. See Mallory, supra note 34, at 170.
41. See Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 529-30. "Historically.... the head of a state
was thought to be the state, a perspective summarized in the famous quip of King
Louis XIV of France, 'L'etat, c'est moi.'" Id.
42. Ild. at 529. "There was no precedent for a doctrine of substantive immunity for
foreign heads of state (as distinct from the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity
generally) until after the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in
1976." ld.
43. Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797-98 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
44. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
The basis for the absolute theory of immunity in this country is also the earliest U.S.
case involving a request for foreign immunity, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
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immunity, foreign states are exempt from all suits in federal court.4
Following a trend in international law recognizing the increased im-
portance of international commerce, 6 the United States, through the
"Tate Letter," instituted a policy favoring a restrictive theory of im-
munity.47 The Tate Letter was a statement, issued by Jack Tate, the
Acting Legal Advisor for the Secretary of State, limiting immunity to
official non-commercial acts of a foreign sovereign.48 Under this new
theory, the United States granted immunity to a foreign sovereign
only for disputed acts that were inherently governmental or public in
nature.49 The United States would no longer grant immunity for non-
governmental or "private" activities, such as a state's commercial
enterprises.5 0
Under the Tate Letter, which arguably is still the current practice
for head-of-state immunity, the State Department issued "sugges-
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-47 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.) (granting immunity from juris-
diction to a French military vessel forced by bad weather to dock in Philadelphia
because the ship was the property of a foreign sovereign). See Verlinden B.V. v. Cen-
tral Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
The Court, however, specifically recognized the difference between a head-of-
state's private acts and the authority of the state itself. The Schooner Exchange, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144-45. The opinion stated that "[w]ithout indicating any opinion
on this question... there is a manifest distinction between the private property of the
person who happens to be a prince, and that military force which supports the sover-
eign power, and maintains the dignity and the independence of a nation." Id.
45. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990).
46. Alfred Dunbill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 701-02 &
n.15 (1976) (listing various countries who had adopted the restrictive theory of foreign
immunity). The Supreme Court's reasoning included "the enormous increase in the
extent to which foreign sovereigns had become involved in international trade [had]
made essential 'a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have
their rights determined in the courts."' Id. at 702 (citation omitted).
47. See Letter From Jack B. Tate, May 19, 1952, reprinted in 26 Dep't. St. Bull.,
June 23, 1952, at 984-85.
48. Id. The Tate Letter did not mention the personal immunity of foreign sover-
eigns. Id.
49. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990).
50. Id. Public acts that are granted immunity (jure hnperii) are distinguishable
from private acts without immunity (jure gestionis). Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976) (app. 2). Jure imperii are limited to (1)
internal administrative acts, (2) legislative acts, (3) acts concerning the armed forces,
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, and (5) acts involving public loans. See Victory
Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
If a foreign state would be immune because the alleged violation is an act de jure
imperii, naming and/or suing the head-of-state can not make the claim viable. See
Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (dismissing a suit against
Prime Minister Thatcher for allowing U.S. planes to take off from British military
bases in order to bomb Libya), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grotnds, 886 F.2d 438
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990). Therefore, if the state may not
receive immunity for an act, conversely neither should the head-of-state for a similar
violation.
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tions" of immunity,"' for foreign immunity on a case-by-case basis.5 2
The Supreme Court held that these State Department determinations
were binding on the judiciary for claims involving foreign sovereign
immunity.53
This method, however, was flawed because judicial reliance on
State Department "suggestions" led to inconsistent, and often politi-
cally-motivated results.5 4 First, the courts often reached contrary re-
sults in similar situations depending on whether or not the State
Department had issued a suggestion.55 The courts also expressed
their concern that sovereign immunity decisions were frequently dic-
51. The court in Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd
mem., sub nom. Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1989),
described the mechanics of issuing a suggestion of immunity:
There is no prescribed statutory procedure for such filing. The process is
typically initiated by a request to the Department of State (State Depart-
ment) from a foreign government whose head of state or immediate family
member has been sued in this country, that the United States file a Sugges-
tion of Immunity in the appropriate court. After weighing the relevant fac-
tors and determining that immunity is appropriate, the Legal Advisor to the
State Department forwards a letter request to the Department of Justice
(Justice) that a Suggestion of Immunity be filed by the appropriate United
States Attorney in the court where the case is pending.
Id (citations omitted). With the weight that is given to "suggestions" of immunity,
the term "suggestion" may be a misnomer.
52. See, e.g., Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 32-35 (1945) (asserting
jurisdiction over a steamship owned by the Republic of Mexico because "[i]n the ab-
sence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the political branch of the govern-
ment, the courts may decide for themselves whether all the requisites of immunity
exist."); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (granting immunity based upon an
executive branch determination to a steamship owned by the Republic of Peru).
53. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 586. The Court reasoned that (1) the case in-
volved the dignity and rights of a friendly sovereign state, (2) such claims are usually
settled by the Executive Branch as a part of conducting foreign affairs, (3) the Execu-
tive Branch would be embarrassed if the courts assumed an "antagonistic jurisdic-
tion," and (4) the national interest would be better served if issues of foreign affairs
were settled through diplomatic negotiation rather than judicial compulsion. Id. at
587-89 (citation omitted); see Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d
1198, 1201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Spail v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614,
617 (5th Cir. 1974); United States of Mex. v. Schmuck, 56 N.E.2d 577, 580 (N.Y.
1944).
54. Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations 147 (6th ed. 1992).
55. Id. Compare Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964) (denying immunity in the absence of an exec-
utive determination because the contract dispute for the carriage of grain was not a
public act), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) with Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. Presi-
dent of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir.) (granting immunity due to the presence of
a State Department "suggestion" of immunity in a contract dispute for the carriage of
grain because of "no alternative but to accept the recommendation of the State De-
partment"), cert denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). As this example shows, executive deter-
minations of sovereign immunity frequently lead to results which were inconsistent
not only with each other but also with the restrictive theory of immunity as well. See
Jet Line Servs., Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1169 (D. Md. 1978)
(citing to pre-FSIA cases inconsistent with the restrictive theory of immunity).
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tated by foreign policy concerns rather than legal criteria 6 Judicial
hostility to pre-FSIA State Department "suggestions" was recounted
by a post-FSIA case:
Sovereign immunity is a stumbling block in the path of good neigh-
borly relations between nations, it is a sour note in the symphony of
international concord, it is a skeleton in the parliament of progress,
it encourages government toward chicanery, deception and dishon-
esty. Sovereign immunity is a colossal effrontery, a brazen repudia-
tion of international moral principles, it is a shameless fraud. 57
Further, if the State Department declined to make a suggestion in a
particular case, the court would be left to grapple with the complexi-
ties of granting immunity without any guidance.58
3. The Codification of Sovereign Immunity
During the 1970s, Congress also became concerned that the State
Department "suggestion" approach was "leaving immunity decisions
subject to diplomatic pressures rather than to the rule of law."15 9 In
1976 Congress enacted the FSIA to govern sovereign immunity. 0
The FSIA codified as federal law the restrictive theory of foreign sov-
ereign immunity,61 and granted immunity from jurisdiction for foreign
states subject to certain enumerated exceptions. 62 Sovereign immu-
nity under the FSIA is not granted in instances where there is: (1) an
express or implied waiver of immunity; (2) involvement in commercial
activities; (3) a taking of property that is currently present in the
United States; (4) an acquisition by gift or succession of property that
is currently in the United States or (5) involvement in certain mari-
time activities.63 The FSIA created jurisdiction in the federal courts
for all cases involving a foreign sovereign if immunity was not
granted.64
56. See Jet Line Servs., 462 F. Supp. at 1169.
57. IL at n.2 (citations omitted).
58. See id.
59. Chuidian v. Philippine Natl Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
61. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1983).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
63. Id. at § 1605(a)(1)-(4), (b).
64. Id. at § 1605(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Furthermore, the FSIA is not in-
tended to affect the substantive law of liability. Michael W. Gordon, Foreign State
Immunity in Commercial Transactions § 6.05 (1991). By way of comparison, head-of-
state immunity cases may still be brought in state courts as was done by some pre-
FSIA sovereign immunity cases. Compare Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304
(Sup. Ct. 1988) (granting immunity at the behest of the State Department to the wife
of the Mexican President), aff'd mem., sub nom. Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546
N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1989) with United States of Mex. v. Schmuck, 56 N.E.2d 577,
580 (N.Y. 1944) (involving pre-FSIA State Department "suggestion" of immunity);
see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 581 N.Y.S.2d 776,777 (App. Div. 1992) (conclud-
ing that the "suggestion" of immunity filed on behalf of a head-of-state by the State
Department entitled him to immunity in a matrimonial action).
1995] 1059
1060 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
Congress intended that the FSIA remove the State Department
from the politically-charged business of issuing "suggestions" of im-
munity in cases involving sovereign immunity.65 As stated in the dec-
laration of purpose of the statute, Congress clearly intended that the
courts should determine the amenability of foreign states to suit in the
United States in order to "serve the interests of justice and.., protect
the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States
courts. 6 6 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that the FSIA is
"the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our
[the United States] courts"'67 because the statute's "purpose is to set
forth 'comprehensive rules governing sovereign immunity.' "68 Fur-
thermore, some federal courts have decided that the FSIA superseded
the State Department's role in "suggesting" sovereign immunity69 de-
65. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606; cf. Kline, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 305 (concluding Congress enacted
the FSIA to remove sovereign immunity suits from the political process but not neces-
sarily head-of-state immunity suits).
Congress had heard testimony about the politicization of the immunity process as
the statute was being drafted. A Dep't of Justice official called for the depoliticization
of immunity questions so that foreign governments could not pressure the executive
branch into making grants of immunity. See States Hearings, supra note 1, at 34 (testi-
mony of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Div., Dep't of
Justice).
In fact, one commentator states:
The State Department sponsored the [FSIA] in large measure because it
found the politicization of sovereign immunity decisions by the Department
to be a considerable embarrassment and thought that moving those deci-
sions into the courts would prove less embarrassing than leaving them in the
Department. The Department, however, has never quite been able to act
upon this perceptive assessment of the situation. It continues to act as an
anicus to advise courts ranging from the lowest trial court up to the
Supreme Court on the correct interpretation and application of the [FSIA]
to the facts of particular cases.
Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 529. For a post-FSIA sovereign immunity case in which
the State Department has suggested its opinion see Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank,
912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988). The legislative history supports this conclusion as
well. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06 (indicating three purposes for the FSIA: (1) to codify the
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity; (2) to apply the statute through judicial
determinations so as to preclude further executive determinations; and (3) to provide
procedures for both plaintiffs and defendants in order to regularize judicial
administration).
67. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
68. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 495 n.22 (1983) (citation
omitted).
69. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Be-
cause the FSIA is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign,
courts have found that the FSIA superseded the State Department's role in 'sug-
gesting' sovereign immunity."); Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797(N.D. Cal. 1987) ("The power of the executive to determine when courts may exercise
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns has been abolished, and those cases inconsistent
with the FSIA are obviously no longer persuasive.").
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spite the State Department attempts to continue asserting its opinions
before the courts.
Although the enactment of the FSIA solved many problems for
sovereign immunity, the statute created new issues regarding head-of-
state immunity because the FSIA does not specifically mention
heads-of-state or contain any references to individuals. 70 This omis-
sion has been the subject of speculation and divergent opinions.71
One conclusion that has been drawn is that the FSIA is ambiguous
regarding the immunity of foreign officials, and therefore the statute's
application should not be limited.72 Another possible construction is
that the FSIA simply does not apply to heads-of-state. 73 General
agreement exists, however, that the creation of the FSIA, which splin-
tered head-of-state immunity from sovereign immunity, created the
current confusion plaguing head-of-state immunity.74
B. The Rationale and Scope of Head-of-State Immunity
The courts often cite to the doctrine of comity as the rationale for
head-of-state immunity.75 According to this doctrine, "each state pro-
tects the immunity concept so that its own head-of-state will be pro-
tected when he or she is abroad.176 Comity is also closely related to
such policies as protecting the dignity of foreign governments and
safeguarding mutual respect among nations.7
70. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
71. As one person stated, "Frankly, we forgot about it [head-of-state immunity],
or didn't know enough about it at the time, during those two or three critical years
when the statute was being formulated." Foreign Governments in United States
Courts, Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 19, 1991), in 85 Am. Soc'y Int'l L 251. 276 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Foreign Governments] (remarks of Mark Feldman).
72. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990).
73. See Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 135-37.
74. See, e.g., Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d. Cir. 1988)
(indicating the absence of any mention of heads-of-state in the FSIA leaves their legal
status uncertain); Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 135 ("Any uncertainty as to the current
scope of head-of-state immunity is due to passage of the [FSIA] in 1976.").
75. See e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45 (indicating the immunity is "founded on the
need for mutual respect and comity among foreign states"); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108,1110 (4th Cir.) (stating that "the rationale of head-
of-state immunity is to promote comity among nations"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987); Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 132 ("Head-of-state immunity is also supported by
the doctrine of comity ....").
76. See Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 132. Comity ensures that "leaders can perform
their duties without being subject to detention, arrest or embarrassment in a foreign
country's legal system." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d at 1110.
77. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 132.
Courts have conveniently explained grants and refusals of immunity in terms of the
purposes of head-of-state immunity. See e.g., Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860
F.2d 40,45-56 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting waiver of Marcos's immunity because to do
otherwise "would serve simply to embarrass the current Philippine government by
allowing its former rulers who allegedly embezzled huge sums of money from [them]
to add insult to injury by claiming immunity in the name of that government"); In re
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Although a universally accepted scope of head-of-state immunity
does not exist,78 a narrow category of persons definitively qualify as
"heads-of-state" for the purposes of immunity. The immunity usually
covers heads-of-state, their families, and heads of governments.79 The
privilege of immunity does not, however, extend to all high-level gov-
ernment officials."0
Head-of-state immunity may be refused by either the United States
or waived by the individual's home country. By refusing to recognize
the government official as a head-of-state,8 ' the United States may
Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir.) (denying immunity to Marcos
because the alternative "would clearly offend the present Philippine government"),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 135
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting Aristide immunity to further the goals of comity).
The purposes of sovereign immunity are similar to the purposes usually given for
head-of-state immunity. See In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45 (comparing the two doctrines
and stating that "each ... doctrine is founded on the need for mutual respect and
comity among foreign states"). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found "[1]ike the related
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the rationale of head-of-state immunity is to promote
comity among nations." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d at 1110.
78. See Bass, supra note 37, at 299 n.1; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817
F.2d at 1110 ("The exact contours of head-of-state immunity, however, are still
unsettled.").
79. Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public Interna-
tional Law, 136-37 (6th ed. 1992).
Immunity in the past has been requested by a variety of leaders in different situa-
tions. For examples in which immunity was granted, see Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F.
Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (dismissing a suit against Prime Minister Thatcher),
aff'd, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); O'Hair v.
Wojtyla, Civ. No. 79-2463 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 1979), quoted in Sovereign Immunity, 1979
Digest § 7, at 897 (dismissing a suit to enjoin the Pope from celebrating the mass on
the Mall in Washington, D.C. following a "suggestion" of immunity); Kilroy v. Wind-
sor, Civ. No. C78-291 (N.D. Ohio 1978), quoted in Special Missions and Trade Dele-
gations, 1978 Digest § 3, at 641-43 (dismissing a suit against the Prince of Wales);
Kendall v. Saudi Arabia, 65 Adm. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), quoted in Sovereign Immunity
Decisions, 1977 Digest app., at 1053-54 (dismissing an attachment of King Faisal's
assets in New York following the State Department's suggestion of immunity); Rich-
ard B. Bilder et al., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 58 Am. J. Int'l L. 165, 186-87 (1964) (discussing the dismissal of a suit
against Kim Yong Shik, the Korean Foreign Minister). But see Republic of the Phil. v.
Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 796-98 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (rejecting both the defendant's and
United States' recommendation of immunity for the Solicitor General of the Philip-
pines under the FSIA).
80. See Republic of the Phil., 665 F. Supp. at 797.
As the litigant's relation to the actual head-of-state or head-of-government in that
particular country grows more tenuous, the claim for immunity becomes weaker.
"The foreign minister-someone who is a cabinet member, perhaps, and en-
joys top status in the government-generally seems to be accorded the same
status as the head of state. Problems arise when you get down to the next
level of government officials, though, because they are not really heads of
state in any traditional sense."
Foreign Governments, supra note 71, at 275 (remarks of David A. Jones, Jr.).
81. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("In
order to assert head of state immunity, a government official must be recognized as a
head of state.").
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withhold this immunity from any claimant!' Because "recognition of
foreign governments and their leaders is a discretionary foreign policy
decision committed to the Executive Branch,"' 3 the judiciary must ac-
cept this decision as binding.'
In addition, this immunity is not an individual's right,ss but a privi-
lege belonging to the individual's state, which may bestow or retract
this benefit.86 Consequently, a former head-of-state may lose immu-
nity for acts committed while in office if the current government
waives such immunity.87 Under the current practice, the courts usu-
ally assert jurisdiction over former heads-of-state who do not receive
State Department "suggestions" of immunity but are given waivers of
immunity from their home countries.' Although the wisdom of hold-
ing former heads-of-state liable for acts committed while in office has
82. Id. at 1520. Indeed, the United States may grant immunity to one official and
withhold immunity from another person of equal or similar rank. "Since ... head of
state immunity is a privilege bestowed within the Executive's discretion, the govern-
ment is not bound to a position it has taken on another foreign official in an entirely
different context." Id. at n.14.
83. Id. at 1519.
84. Id.
For example, Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega was not granted head-of-state
immunity because he was not the recognized head-of-state either under the Panama-
nian Constitution or by the United States. ld. Officially, Noriega was the Com-
mandante of the Panamanian Defense Forces and the United States had continued to
recognize President Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate leader of Panama. Id.
Having accepted the U.S. government's decision, the court rejected Noriega's argu-
ment that head-of-state immunity should be granted to him "regardless of the source
of his power or the nature of his rule." Id. at 1520.
Alternatively, although Haitian President Aristide had been ousted from power by
a military coup in 1991, the court granted him immunity as the head-of-state recog-
nized by the U.S. government. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 130
(E.D.N.Y. 1994). The court concluded that "[wihether the recognized head-of-state
has defacto control of the government is irrelevant; the courts must defer to the Exec-
utive determination." ld. at 132 (citation omitted).
85. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir.) (con-
cluding that the immunity is "primarily an attribute of state sovereignty, not an indi-
vidual right"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
86. Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40,45 (2d Cir. 1988). "Because it is
the state that gives the power to lead and the ensuing trappings of power-including
immunity-the state may therefore take back that which it bestowed upon its erst-
while leaders." Id.
87. Id. The court rejected the Marcoses' argument that "the doctrine must also
serve a 'protective function' of 'shield[ing] human decision-makers from the chilling
effect of future liability ... ."' Id. at 46 (citation omitted). Another court also re-
jected the Marcoses' argument that allowing waiver would "degrade ex-rulers who
happen to fall out of favor with their former constituents or political successors." In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d at 1111. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that "a funda-
mental characteristic of state sovereignty is the right to determine which individuals
may raise the flag of the ship of state and which may not." Id.
88. See, e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45-50 (asserting jurisdiction over the former
Philippine President in the absence of immunity from either the home government or
the State Department); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d at 1110-11 (same);
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (same for the Haitian military leader).
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been questioned, the issue should not be resolved by the judicial
branch.89
In summary, head-of-state immunity and sovereign immunity have
evolved from common origins in international customary law into sep-
arate doctrines. The pre-FSIA confusion surrounding the application
of sovereign immunity has largely been resolved by judicial applica-
tion of the FSIA.90 In the case of sovereign immunity, the enactment
of the FSIA has (1) codified the restrictive theory of immunity, (2)
granted federal jurisdiction, (3) become the sole basis of jurisdiction
for suits against foreign states, (4) superseded the State Department
"suggestion" of immunity approach, and (5) prevented state immunity
determinations from being based on purely political considerations.
Head-of-state immunity, on the other hand, still involves the auto-
matic grant of absolute immunity if the State Department issues a
"suggestion" of immunity and remains mired in confusion regarding
its scope. These problems, which were also faced by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and resolved by the FSIA, indicate that head-of-
state immunity would similarly benefit by a change from executive
determination to statutory clarification.
II. Two APPROACHES: ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY AT THE SUGGESTION
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR REsTRICTIvE IMMUNITY
UNDER THE FSIA
The courts have taken divergent approaches to head-of-state immu-
nity since the inception of the FSIA. Part II.A will discuss the ap-
proach of the Eastern District of New York in Aristide v. Lafontant
that applies the outdated pre-FSIA practice of granting absolute im-
munity in accordance with executive branch determinations of head-
of-state immunity.9' Part II.B discusses the Ninth Circuit's application
of a restrictive theory of head-of-state immunity in the Marcos case
under an expansive and controversial reading of the FSIA.92 The
courts' differing approaches underscore the need for statutory
clarification.
89. Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86 Civ. 0207, slip op. at 7 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986)("Until such time as head of state immunity is made a creature of judicial interpreta-
tion, this court will not intrude on the prerogative of the executive branch to make
such determinations.").
90. See Gary B. Born & W. Hardy Callcott, Case Note, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 371, 375
(1989) ("This route [federal legislation] has been taken with some success for sover-
eign and diplomatic immunity .. .
91. See infra part II.A.
92. See infra part II.B.
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A. Absolute Immunity at the Suggestion of the State Department
In Lafontant v. Aristide,93 Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of
New York presented a lengthy analysis of head-of-state immunity that
has received both attention and criticism.9 The Aristide court's con-
clusion, that the pre-FSIA executive determination method still ap-
plies to head-of-state immunity because head-of-state immunity is not
explicitly included in the statute, has been followed by other district
courts.95
1. Lafontant v. Aristide
The plaintiff in Aristide sought compensation in money damages for
the killing of her husband by Haitian soldiers who were allegedly act-
ing on the orders of the President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrande Aristide.96
Dr. Roger Lafontant had been jailed for attempting a coup d'etat
against Aristide.97 The defendant submitted a "suggestion" of immu-
nity from the State Department claiming immunity because of his sta-
tus as the head-of-state of Haiti,98 and the court promptly dismissed
the action.99
In a lengthy discussion of the FSIA and common-law precedents,
the court explained its decision to follow the State Department's de-
termination.100 The court concluded that the "pre-1976 suggestion of
immunity procedure survives the FSIA with respects to heads-of-
state" because neither the language nor the legislative history of the
FSIA addresses heads-of-state specifically. 101 The court further rea-
soned that the FSIA "was crafted primarily to allow state-owned com-
panies... to be sued in United States courts in connection with their
commercial activities . . . while leaving traditional head-of-state
93. 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
94. See, Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 528-29 ("Judge Weinstein's opinion presents
the most extended and most carefully reasoned analysis of the so-called head-of-state
immunity doctrine to date .... [His] theory seems to me to be wrong as a matter of
law and as a matter of policy.").
95. See e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, Nos. 94-9069, 1544, 94-035,1541, 1995 WL 604585,
at *14 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 1995) (referring to Aristide as indicating the determinative
power of the executive branch in head-of-state immunity cases); Aicog v. Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, No. CIV.A.H-93-4169,1994 WL 447620, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10,1994)
(referring to Aristide to support its decision to grant immunity to the King of Saudi
Arabia at the suggestion of the State Department).
96. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 130.
97. Itt
98. Id. This letter declared the State Department's opinion that "permitting this
action to proceed against President Aristide would be incompatible with the United
States' foreign policy interests." Id. at 131.
99. Id. at 130.
100. Id. at 131-37.
101. Id. at 137. Consequently, all of the reasons for following executive determina-
tions of immunity decisions elucidated by the Supreme Court in Er parte Pent are still
valid. See supra note 53.
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and diplomatic immunities untouched."1"2 Consequently, under the
court's analysis, heads-of-state may receive absolute immunity at the
request of the State Department without reference to the FSIA. 10 3
2. Other Courts Following the Aristide Rationale
The Southern District of New York followed the Aristide court's
lead in Doe v. Karadzic.1 1 In Karadzic, victims of human rights viola-
tions committed by Bosnian-Serbs brought a class action suit against
the self-proclaimed president of a Bosnian-Serb entity. 105 Although
the defendant claimed head-of-state immunity, the United States had
not recognized either his leadership or his state. 10 6
After briefly addressing Karadzic's claim for immunity, the court
ultimately declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction on other
grounds. 0 7 As an initial point, however, the court considered that
Karadzic's claim for head-of-state immunity would be determined by
State Department decisions. 0 The court reasoned that "[w]ere the
Executive Branch to declare defendant a head-of-state, this Court
would be stripped of jurisdiction. This consideration, while not dis-
positive at this point in the litigation, militates against the Court exer-
cising jurisdiction over the instant action.' 0 9
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and granted subject matter
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act.1 0 As for the district court's
head-of-state analysis, the Second Circuit followed the Aristide rea-
soning so far as to admit that future recognition by the executive
branch of Karadzic as a head-of-state may immunize his actions."'
The court further reasoned, however, "[e]ven if such future recogni-
tion, determined by the Executive Branch, would create head-of-state
immunity, it would be entirely inappropriate for a court to create the
functional equivalent of such an immunity based on speculation about
what the Executive Branch might do in the future.""'  Although cit-
102. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 137.
103. See id.
104. 866 F. Supp. 734, 737-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, Kadic v. Karadzic, Nos. 94-
9069, 1544, 94-9-35, 1541, 1995 WL 604585 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 1995) (involving two
groups of plaintiffs).
105. Md at 734-35. Defendant Karadzic was the leader of the Bosnian-Serb military
faction. Id. at 735. The plaintiffs alleged that Karadzic ordered the Bosnian-Serb
forces to engage in "ethnic cleansing" which included the following torts: genocide,
war crimes, wrongful death, torture, rape, and intentional infliction of emotional
harm. Il at 736.
106. See id. at 737-38.
107. Id. at 737-38. The court decided subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under
either the Alien Tort Claim Act or the Torture Victim Protection Act. Id. at 740-43.
108. IL at 737-38.
109. Id. (citing Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)).
110. See Kadic v. Karadzic, Nos. 94-9069, 1544, 94-9035, 1541, 1995 WL 604585, at
*8 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 1995).
111. Id- at *14.
112. I& at *14 (citations omitted).
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ing to Aristide several times, the court also referred to a prior Second
Circuit case, In re Doe,113 to assert that the scope of head-of-state
immunity is still unsettled." 4
The Aristide decision was also followed by a district court in Texas.
In Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,115 two family servants of the
Royal Family of Saudi Arabia sued, among others, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. 16 The plaintiffs
claimed false imprisonment and abuse at the hands of Saudi officials
during a trip to Houston where their employer, Prince Saad, was re-
ceiving medical treatment."17
The King moved to dismiss on the basis of head-of-state immu-
nity.118 The State Department intervened on behalf of the King by
acknowledging that King Fahd is the head-of-state of Saudi Arabia." 9
After briefly discussing head-of-state immunity, the court accepted
the recognition by the United States as conclusive. 20 Reasoning that
the head-of-state as recognized by the executive branch is immune
from personal jurisdiction in the United States, the court dismissed
the case against King Fahd. l2 1
3. A Critique of the Aristide Approach
The "suggestion" of immunity approach "preserv[es] the pre-FSIA
'absolute' theory of immunity."'12 Under this approach, the courts
will grant immunity to the head-of-state at the behest of the State De-
partment regardless of the nature of the alleged act.'23 In fact, unlike
sovereign immunity, head-of-state immunity has evolved very little
since the time when the Tate Letter tried unsuccessfully to control
grants of immunity through executive determinations. 24
The courts have given many reasons for maintaining absolute im-
munity in the head-of-state area. Many of these justifications are
based on the same exaggerated concerns raised about pre-FSIA sover-
113. 860 F.2d 40, 45-50 (2d Cir. 1988).
114. Kadic, 1995 WL 604585, at *14.
115. No. Civ.A.H-93-4169, 1994 WL 447620 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1994).
116. k at *1.
117. Id The plaintiffs claimed that they were not allowed to leave the Houston
hotel unless accompanied by a guard. Id Although after five months in Houston, the
two left the hotel unimpeded, consular officers refused to deliver to the plaintiffs their
passports and travel papers. I& Prince Saad, the brother of King Fahd, subsequently
died in July of 1993. Id
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id
120. Id (citing to Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) for
support in concluding that courts must defer to executive determinations of head-of-
state immunity).
121. Id
122. Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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eign immunity. For example, the Aristide court referred to concerns
about comity and the executive's role in forming foreign policy as jus-
tifications for the State Department retaining decisive control over
grants of head-of-state immunity.'15 In addition, the State Depart-
ment has used either a "suggestion" of immunity procedure, or a vari-
ation thereof, for many years.' 2 6 This practice parallels a similar
procedure regarding claims of diplomatic immunity'27 and the pre-
FSIA practice regarding claims of foreign state immunity. 28 Foreign
heads-of-state have also claimed that because absolute immunity is
given to United States heads-of-state, as a matter of respect the courts
should extend the same privilege to foreign leaders.'2 9
Some of these reasons bear a striking similarity to the pre-FSIA
concerns about sovereign immunity-issues that were later shown to
be greatly exaggerated. 30 The use of "suggestions" of immunity can-
not base its legitimacy on the pre-FSIA sovereign immunity common
law history for the FSIA was enacted precisely because the common
law approach proved unworkable.13 ' Moreover, only in the head-of-
state immunity cases does the State Department still attempt to assert
125. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 137.
126. See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1974). By way of compari-
son, diplomatic immunity does not cover an action arising out of an individual's pri-
vate commercial activity. See Vienna Convention, supra note 37.
127. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text for discussion on diplomatic
immunity.
128. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (considering the lack of a
State Department issued "suggestion" of immunity in a pre-FSIA determination of
sovereign immunity).
129. See Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) for the proposition that "a former President
of the United States enjoyed immunity from damages liability for acts within the
outer perimeter of his official responsibility"). The Second Circuit decided to wait to
explore this avenue of reasoning as the proof against the Marcoses developed. Id. at
361.
The Marcoses later made the same argument in the Fourth Circuit. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987). The Fourth Circuit discounted the argument and distinguished Nixon as ap-
plying only to civil liability. Id. The court said "[t]he issue in this case, however, is not
whether the Marcos' [sic] may be civilly liable, but whether they are wholly immune
from process. Moreover,... an ex-President may be subpoenaed 'to produce relevant
evidence in a criminal case,' and even a sitting President may not claim immunity
from a criminal subpoena." ld. (citations omitted).
130. For example, the Fifth Circuit in a pre-FSIA case stated that "the judiciary
must be sensitive to the overriding necessity that courts not interfere with the execu-
tive's proper handling of foreign affairs." Spacil, 489 F.2d at 616 (involving a "sugges-
tion" of immunity for a Cuban vessel seized in the United States). The FSIA's
application through the years has shown that this concern was unfounded at least with
respect to sovereign immunity. See Deliapenna, supra note 6, at 531. Indeed, the
FSIA has fostered a degree of certainty in litigation involving foreign states by reduc-
ing the political influence of the government. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank,
912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990) (involving an instance where the court analyzed a
case on its own despite a Statement of Interest from the government).
131. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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binding determinations. 132 Lastly, the courts have rejected the reci-
procity argument that because domestic heads-of-state may get immu-
nity, so should foreign heads-of-state. 33
The "suggestion" of immunity procedure for head-of-state immu-
nity still presents the same problems for the courts as it did during
pre-FSIA sovereign immunity cases. First, the courts have applied
inconsistent approaches to cases that present similar issues.1' More-
over, the "suggestion" of immunity process has few procedural safe-
guards.135 When the State Department does not issue a suggestion of
immunity, the courts are left to grapple with these complex issues with
little guidance from existing case law." As the Second Circuit noted:
"When lacking guidance from the executive branch, as here, a court is
left to decide for itself whether a head-of-state is or is not entitled to
imunity."1 37 Unfortunately, the courts have little guidance from the
common law because of the ad hoc nature of head-of-state immunity
decisions resulting from the State Department "suggestion" of immu-
nity approach.13 8
In addition, the courts are the appropriate body to make determina-
tions of immunity because the State Department is subject to greater
political pressures in issuing these determinations.1 39 The State De-
132. See Foreign Governments, supra note 71, at 275. "[It really is only in the head
of state immunity realm that the U.S. Government still goes into court and lays out a
series of rules and findings of fact to bind the court in the way the pre-FSIA sugges-
tions of immunity did in all of these areas." Id. (remarks of David A. Jones, Jr.).
133. See supra note 129.
134. See Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Phil., 694 F. Supp. 782, 785 (W.D.
Wash. 1988), appeal dismissed, sub. nom. Estate of Domingo v. Marcos, 895 F.2d 416
(9th Cir. 1990). In Estate of Domingo, the Marcoses were sued for allegedly executing
two political opponents. I& at 783. In 1982, the court granted the Marcoses immunity
and dismissed the case against them. Id. In 1987, the court reinstated the Marcoses as
defendants "holding that once they left office, the Marcoses could not claim immunity
as heads of state." Id. On a motion for rehearing, the court concluded that since a
"suggestion" of immunity had not been reissued in the second case, Marcos may be
tried for acts he committed while formerly in office. lId at 785-86.
135. Professor Lowenfeld's discussion of the State Department pre-FSIA applica-
tion of sovereign immunity points out that the State Department did not need to
explain the reasoning behind its decision and the decision was not appealable. See
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating A Sovereign Immunity Claim-The Haiti Case, 49
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 377, 391 (1974).
A State Department head-of-state immunity decision based on the foreign leader's
political leverage "deprives the concept of due process of all meaning." See Mark A.
Sherman, Comment, An Inquiry Regarding the International and Domestic Legal
Problems Presented in United States v. Noriega, 20 U. Miami Inter-Am. L Rev. 393,
417 (1989).
136. See Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
137. Id.
138. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 226-28. Political pressure to grant immunity is a recurring
problem with immunities issued by the State Department. The FSIA was enacted to
alleviate this problem in the sovereign immunity area. See supra note 65 and accom-
panying text.
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partment is dependent on the foreign government's internal political
climate in determining questions of immunity. The executive branch
has to weigh such political considerations as the relationship and the
relative popularities of the former government and the new leader-
ship.14° The State Department's determinations are also sensitive to
the relationship between the United States and the foreign state at
that particular time.' 4 1 Shifting relations between states or individual
heads-of-states can hardly form the basis of a coherent body of law.1 42
Finally, the State Department has been accused of invoking head-of-
state immunity in an attempt to control litigation against high foreign
officials, contrary to the intent of the FSIA. 143
B. Restrictive Immunity Under the FSIA
In a radical departure from the approach of the Aristide court, the
Ninth Circuit has adopted a broad interpretation of the FSIA in the
Marcos case.'" The Ninth Circuit reads sovereign immunity under
the FSIA to apply both to states and heads-of-state. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit interprets the FSIA to immunize individuals who are sued as a
result of acting in their official capacities. 45
With respect to diplomatic immunity, in which the State Department still takes a
limited part in issuing determinations of immunity, the government is pressured into
granting immunity even when it is not justified. Head of State Immunity: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 13, n.26 (Dec. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Immunity Hearings] (testimony of Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Professor of Law, Villanova University) (referring to Abdulaziz v. Me-
tropolitian Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 1984) (dismissing case
against Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia who was given diplomatic status as a "special
envoy" after the proceedings were instituted)). For a discussion of the procedure
involved in issuing diplomatic immunity see infra notes 244-48 and accompanying
text.
140. See Erin M. Callan, Comment, In re Mr. & Mrs. Doe: Witnesses Before the
Grand Jury and the Head of State Immunity Doctrine, 22 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 117,
118-19 (1989) (discussing Congressional dislike of the Marcoses). Although President
Reagan was a close friend of the Marcoses, he did not suggest immunity on their
behalf because such a move would have been politically unwise in a presidential elec-
tion year. Id. at 137 n.107.
141. See id. at 136-37.
142. In the context of sovereign immunity and the pre-FSIA debate, Lowenfeld
argues "[i]n the long run ... foreign relations would probably be better served by a
position of equal treatment for all foreign states than it would by considering each
case in the context of current relations with the country concerned." Lowenfeld, supra
note 135, at 390. This argument serves the purposes of head-of-state immunity as
well. In one case, for example, the Marcoses lost their immunity when the State De-
partment did not reissue a "suggestion" of immunity after they were exiled. See Es-
tate of Domingo v. Republic of the Phil., 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
143. See Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 531.
144. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
145. Id. at 1470-71; see also Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103
(9th Cir. 1990) (granting immunity under the FSIA to a government official acting in
his official capacity).
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1. The FSIA's Application to Individual Officials
In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank,"4 the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the FSIA to an individual who was not a head-of-state. 14 7
Chuidian concerned a bank manager acting in his official capacity as
the head of the Philippine government bank.1'8 After discussing the
language and history of the FSIA the Chuidian court decided that
"[t]he most that can be concluded from the preceding discussion is
that the Act is ambiguous as to its extension to individual foreign offi-
cials. Under such circumstances, we decline to limit its application as
.. [to do so would be] entirely inconsistent 'with the purposes of the
Act. " 1
4 9
The Ninth Circuit held that the FSIA does not immunize foreign
officials engaged in acts beyond the scope of their authority.15° The
court disagreed with the government's position that the FSIA did not
affect pre-1976 common law with respect to foreign officials.' 5 ' The
court also suggested that the government's position would undermine
the FSIA.152 Because a "bifurcated approach to sovereign immunity
was not intended by the Act," the court interpreted the FSIA as in-
cluding individuals within its meaning.lss
146. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
147. See id. at 1103.
148. Id. at 1106. Chuidian had settled a claim with the Philippines Export and For-
eign Loan Guarantee Corporation, an instrumentality of the Republic of the Philip-
pines. Id. at 1097. This settlement included an irrevocable letter of credit issued by
the Philippine National Bank to Chuidian on behalf of the Corporation. Id. Daza, an
official of the Philippine government, suspected fraud in the settlement and instructed
the Bank to dishonor the letter of credit. Id. Chuidian then instituted a suit against
the Bank and Daza in California state court. Ld.
Daza claimed immunity under the FSIA because he qualified as an "agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state." Id. at 1099. Chuidian contended that the FSIA did
not apply or, alternatively, that one of the exceptions of the FSIA applied. Id. The
government, in a "Statement of Interest of the United States," contended that the
FSIA does not apply but immunity should nevertheless issue under the general princi-
ples of sovereign immunity expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law § 66(b). Id.
149. IL at 1101.
150. Id. at 1106.
151. Id. at 1102.
152. Id. at 1102-03. The FSIA would be undermined by "a peculiar variant of fo-
rum shopping .... Litigants who doubted the influence and diplomatic ability of their
sovereign adversary would choose to proceed against the official, hoping to secure
State Department support, while litigants less favorably positioned would be inclined
to proceed against the foreign state directly." Id.
153. Id. The court stated three reasons for its conclusion:
First, every indication shows that Congress intended the Act to be compre-
hensive, and courts have consistently so interpreted its provisions.... Sec-
ond, a bifurcated interpretation of the Act would be counter to Congress's
stated intent of removing the discretionary role of the State Department....
Furthermore, no authority supports the continued validity of the pre-1976
common law in light of the Act. Indeed, the American Law Institute re-
cently issued the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, superseding
the Second Restatement relied upon by the government in this action. The
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The Court agreed with the bank manager that his actions were acts
committed by an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under
section 1603(b) of the FSIA.1'54 The court reasoned that "[w]hile sec-
tion 1603(b) may not explicitly include individuals within its definition
of foreign instrumentalities, neither does it expressly exclude them.
The terms 'agency,' 'instrumentality,' 'organ,' 'entity,' and 'legal
person,' while perhaps more readily connoting an organization or col-
lective, do not in their typical legal usage necessarily exclude individu-
als."' 55 Likewise, the court noted that the legislative history does not
mention any intent to exclude individuals from the FSIA. 56 Finally,
the court once again underscored the FSIA's purpose to codify ex-
isting common law principles of sovereign immunity.157
The Ninth Circuit supported its decision to apply the FSIA to indi-
viduals by referring to a line of cases starting in the Southern District
of New York.' 58 The first case in this series, Rios v. Marshall,59 was
an antitrust and civil rights class action brought by farm workers
against various apple and sugar cane growers, and federal and state
officials. 160 In discussing the FSIA claim the court said merely, "inso-
far as Edwards [the foreign official] is sued in his official capacity as
agent of the instrumentality, he is equally protected by principles of
foreign sovereign immunity.' 6' Rios was followed by two district
new Restatement deletes in its entirety the discussion of the United States
common law of sovereign immunity, and substitutes a section analyzing such
issues exclusively under the Act.
Id. at 1102-03 (citations omitted). Since the time of the Chuidian decision in 1990,
several courts have recognized the continued validity of the pre-1976 common law.
See supra part II.A. Nevertheless, the court's interpretation of the Restatements re-
mains true.
154. See id. at 1100-01. The FSIA provides, in relevant part:
For purposes of this chapter -
(a) A 'foreign state' ... includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection
(b).
(b) An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor
created under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1988).
155. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1990).
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id. at 1103.
159. 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
160. Idt at 355-56. The court in Rios granted motions to dismiss to three of the
defendants, the Government of Jamaica, the British West Indies Central Labor Or-
ganization, and the Organization's chief liaison agent in the United States, Harold
Edwards, under the FSIA. Id. at 370-71.
161. Id. at 371.
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court cases in which the courts did not discuss at any length the
FSIA's applicability to individuals.162
The next case in the series, Kline v. Kaneko,163 presented an inter-
esting blend of head-of-state immunity and the applicability of the
FSIA to individuals. 1" In Kline, the plaintiff brought suit against the
Secretary of the Government of Mexico and the wife of the Mexican
President, Paloma Cordero De La Madrid, for expulsion from Mexico
without process.16 The federal district court dismissed the complaint
against the Secretary holding that the FSIA "appl[ies] to individual
defendants when they are sued in their official capacity."'' 1  Employ-
ing reasoning similar to that of Chuidian, the court held that the FSIA
applied because the Secretary was a "political subdivision" or an
"agency or instrumentality" of Mexico within the meaning of section
1603.167 As to the case against the wife of the Mexican President,
however, the court concluded the FSIA did not immunize the actions
of Mrs. De La Madrid because she did not have an official position
with the government.16 With the removal of the FSIA claim, the fed-
eral court lost jurisdiction and the case was remanded to state court.169
The state court granted Mrs. De La Madrid head-of-state immunity
because the State Department fied a "suggestion" of immunity for
her.170
In Herbage v. Meese,'71 decided later in the same year as Chuidian,
the District of Columbia district court also held that individual offi-
cials acting in their official capacity are sovereigns within the meaning
of the FSIA.12 After being extradited to the United States from the
United Kingdom, Herbage sued various British officials alleging viola-
tions in his extradition process. 73 The court referred to the same se-
ries of cases cited in Chuidian'74 and discussed the notable absence of
162. See American Bonded Warehouse v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F.
Supp. 861, 863 (N.D. M1l. 1987) ("Defendants Francois Bachelet and Joe Miller, sued in
their respective capacities as employees of Air France [an instrumentality of the gov-
ernment of France] are also protected by the FSIA."); Mueller v. Diggleman, No. 82
Civ. 5513 (CBM), 1983 WL 25419, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983) (concluding that
judges and clerks of a foreign court, sued in their official capacities, are entitled to
immunity under the FSIA).
163. 685 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
164. Id. at 388.
165. Id.
166. Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
167. Id. at 392.
168. Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (Sup. CL 1988), aff 'd mer., sub nor.
Kline v. Cordero De La Madrid, 546 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1989).
169. Kline, 685 F. Supp. at 388-89.
170. Kline, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
171. 747 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 1564 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 605 (1991).
172. See id. at 67.
173. Id. at 62.
174. Id at 66; see supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
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any reference to natural persons in the FSIA. 75 Deciding that the
"British defendants are agents of a 'political subdivision' within the
meaning of the FSIA," the court granted them immunity under the
FSIA.
176
2. The FSIA's Application to Heads-of-State
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit analyzed a head-of-state case, In re Estate
of Marcos, for the first time under the FSIA.177 The court did not
make any specific references to head-of-state immunity but analyzed
the case under sovereign immunity. 178 The suit was brought against
the former president of the Philippines by the families of people who
allegedly had been tortured and executed in the Philippines under
Marcos' authority.179 The Estate first contended that the case should
be dismissed because the cause of action did not meet any of the ex-
ceptions to immunity set forth in the FSIA.8 0 The Estate also argued
that Marcos' actions were "official or public acts" and therefore non-
justiciable acts of state.181
The court concluded that the FSIA did not immunize former Presi-
dent Marcos's human rights violations because these acts were not of-
ficial acts covered by his authority as head-of-state.1 2  Because
"Marcos' acts were not taken within any official mandate and were
therefore not the acts of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state within the meaning of FSIA ... [n]o exception to FSIA thus
175. Herbage, 947 F. Supp. at 66.
176. Id. at 67 & n.13.
177. See Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
178. See id. at 1468-72. This approach is consistent with earlier circuit precedent
because under Chuidian any authorized actions of a state official would fall within the
domain of the FSIA. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th
Cir. 1990). Presumably, in appropriate circumstances, the court would look to the
FSIA and withhold immunity for any acts which fell into one of the exceptions for
immunity.
179. Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995). Initially the suit had also been brought against
Marcos' daughter, Imee Marcos-Manotoc, who had controlled the military police. Id.
In prior proceedings, Marcos-Mantoc moved to set aside a default judgment against
her. See Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2960 (1993). The Ninth Circuit concluded that although the FSIA was implicated, the
statute did not apply to these particular circumstances. Id. Since "she has admitted
acting on her own authority, not on the authority of the Republic of the Philip-
pines.... [H]er acts cannot have been taken within any official mandate and there-
fore cannot have been acts of an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state within the
meaning of the FSIA." Id.
180. Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
181. Id. at 1471.
182. Id. As the court viewed the situation, " 'Ferdinand Marcos does not appear to
have had the authority of an absolute autocrat. He was not the state, but the head of
the state, bound by the laws that applied to him.'" Id. (citations omitted).
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need be demonstrated."' 3 In fact, the court decided the FSIA did not
even apply in this instance.'81 By declaring the FSIA inapplicable to
Marcos, the court implicitly authorized applying the FSIA to heads-
of-states in some circumstances.
The court's analysis invoked the FSIA because a suit against an in-
dividual official is "the practical equivalent of a suit against the sover-
eign directly. ' 1' ss Nevertheless, the court reasoned that "[a] lawsuit
against a foreign official acting outside the scope of his authority does
not implicate any of the foreign diplomatic concerns involved in bring-
ing suit against another government in United States courts."'" For
all of these reasons, the Ninth Circuit allowed the suit against Marcos'
Estate' 87 and ultimately held that the plaintiffs had a viable cause of
action despite Marcos' death."s
3. A Critique of The Ninth Circuit's Approach
Even though the FSIA provides the only existing statutory basis for
jurisdiction over foreign states and their agencies or instrumentali-
ties,'89 courts have found many problems with applying the statute as
written to heads-of-state. 9 First, the FSIA does not specifically men-
tion individuals.' 9' Second, the FSIA defines foreign state as the
"state and its agencies or instrumentalities."'19 Although the term
"agency" may embrace individuals, stretching the word's meaning
deviates from Congressional intent. 93 Moreover, the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law which was written after the FSIA
183. Id. at 1472 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. The Ninth Circuit ultimately granted the plaintiff's cause of action against
Marcos's Estate under the Alien Tort Act. Id. at 1475.
185. Id. at 1472. (quoting Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101
(1990)).
186. Id. The court bolstered its reasoning by indicating the Philippine govern-
ment's agreement to the suit against Marcos. Id.
187. Id. -
188. Id. at 1476. The court continued its discussion under the Alien Tort Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1350. Id. at 1472-74. Since the court did not even mention head-of-state
immunity, this omission implies that the FSIA analysis covered both head-of-state
immunity and sovereign immunity.
189. Id. at 1469-70.
190. See e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The
view that the FSIA is inapplicable to a head-of-state comports with both the history of
the FSIA and the underlying policy of comity."); Lininger, supra note 30, at 185
("[Mlost human rights suits against foreign states are vulnerable to dismissal under
the FSIA.")
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988).
192. Id.
193. Examples of types of agencies or instrumentalities listed in the legislative his-
tory do not include any individuals. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 15-
16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6604, 6614 (listing state trading companies,
mining enterprises, airlines, steel companies, central banks, export associations, gov-
ernment procurement agencies, and ministries as examples of agencies or instrumen-
talities). Additionally, individuals are not mentioned in the legislative history. Id.
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was enacted also conforms to the common understanding that the
FSIA does not apply to individuals.' 94
The Ninth Circuit's extension of the FSIA to cover individual offi-
cials has been met with criticism. 195 Although head-of-state immunity
should have limits, heads-of-state are included in the FSIA only
through a convoluted reading of the statute. This interpretation devi-
ates both from the language of the statute and congressional intent.196
The omission in the FSIA of any mention of heads-of-state should be
treated as an oversight by the drafters, and the statute amended to
clearly address this immunity.
In summary, these cases highlight the need for clear statutory gui-
dance in this area by showing the different ways in which head-of-
state immunity is treated. The Aristide decision has emerged as the
standard support for the argument that the State Department should
retain control over head-of-state immunity. On the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit proposes a convoluted but statutory answer to this issue.
These approaches gloss over concerns in order to achieve other
policies. 97
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING
HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY
Any solution to the current split in authority surrounding head-of-
state immunity needs to address two issues. First, as part III.A dis-
cusses, the solution must explicitly state that a restrictive theory of
foreign immunity should apply to head-of-state immunity. Second, as
part III.B explores, the solution must be statutory. Clearly stated
guidelines would allow the lower courts to apply the FSIA uniformly
in head-of-state cases. The best solution is to amend the FSIA.
194. Compare Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 451-60 (1992) (omitting any reference to individuals within the meaning of sover-
eign immunity) with Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 66 (1962) (including individuals within the meaning of pre-FSIA sovereign
immunity). The Ninth Circuit in Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095
(9th Cir. 1990) has acknowledged the significance of this change. See supra note 153.
195. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Claim to Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Individuals
Sued For International Human Rights Violations, 15 Whittier L. Rev. 465, 467-68
(1994); Lininger, supra note 30 at 187-88.
196. One commentator notes:
I'm quite concerned about the drift of the cases on head of state immunity
.... It was never the intention of the drafters of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to encompass that .... In my days in the State Department,
when we subsequently confronted that issue, it became my conviction that
there should be absolute immunity for suits against foreign officials relating
to acts of official duty, and that those actions ought to be brought in the U.S.
courts against the foreign state when the conditions of the [FSIA] were pres-
ent and justify the jurisdiction.
Foreign Governments, supra note 71, at 276 (remarks of Mark Feldman).
197. See Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 529 ("This theory [in Aristide] seems to me to
be wrong as a matter of law and as a matter of policy.").
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A. The Restrictive Theory Should Apply to Head-of-State Immunity
The United States should adopt a restrictive approach to head-of-
state immunity. Subject to proper jurisdiction, a head-of-state should
be liable in court for his private and commercial activities. 19 Courts
and scholars have argued that the purposes of head-of-state immunity,
namely comity and its related principles, would not be implicated in
holding a foreign head-of-state liable for his private and commercial
activities. 199 As one commentator noted, "[T]he interests of justice or
regulatory goals predominate when the state or the officeholder de-
scends from the heights of sovereign (or public or official) duty to the
plane of private or commercial activity or otherwise behaves so that
the shield of immunity is lost."2 ' A head-of-state who behaves as a
private actor in commerce should be subject to the same rules as other
private actors.
Several compelling arguments favor the application of the restric-
tive immunity approach. For example, in the modem global economy
many heads-of-state are involved as independent private actors in
commercial activities."' Of the twenty-five richest people in the
world, six are members of ruling families and may assert a claim of
head-of-state immunity. 2 Although the number of people who could
claim head-of-state immunity may seem small, the potential for harm
resulting from a liberal approach is evidenced by the BCC203 scandal
where the head-of-state of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-
Nahyan, was involved in a $1.5 billion suit for allegedly conspiring to
defraud the United States banking system.2 1 If he had been declared
immune, his victims would never have been compensated and he
would have been able to wreak economic havoc with impunity.
198. See Immunity Hearings, supra note 139, at 23-24 (memorandum of Andreas
Lowenfeld, Professor, New York University Law School) ("Whether the challenged
commercial activity was carried out by the head of state as agent or as principal, the
head of state should be required to answer for it in court, subject of course to the
other requirements of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, but without benefit of
any immunity.").
199. See Immunity Hearings, supra note 139, at 17 (testimony of Joseph W. Del-
lapenna, Professor of Law, Villanova University) (stating the reasons for head-of-
state immunity narrowly, namely avoidance of embarrassment to the executive
branch and interfering in the political affairs of a foreign country).
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion. See Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of
Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. C. 934 (1995).
200. Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 531-32. The only reason to treat foreign heads-of-
state differently from foreign states is to avoid "the personal affront that arises from
the service of process and consequent claim of personal jurisdiction upon a foreign
head of state on an official visit." Id
201. See Immunity Hearings, supra note 139, at 7 (statement of Virgil Mattingly,
General Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Bank).
202. Id.
203. BCCI is the common name of the now-defunct Bank of Credit & Commerce
International. See Sovereign Impunity, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1993, at A14.
204. Id.; see infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
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By way of comparison, the increase in international commerce was
a factor in the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity in the United States.2"5 Support for the proposition that a sover-
eign state, or leader entering into the private market place should not
be allowed the sovereign's privilege of immunity can be found as far
back as Chief Justice John Marshall's opinions:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes
a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns
the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and
takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the
company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level
with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character
which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be
transacted.2z0
The increase in head-of-state involvement in American commercial
activities parallels a general increase in foreign direct investment in
the United States,20 7 and foreign investment is expected to grow even
further.20 8 Because the trend of foreign heads-of-state entering into
205. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 702
(1976) ("[T]he enormous increase in the extent to which foreign sovereigns had be-
come involved in international trade made essential 'a practice which will enable per-
sons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.'"
(citation omitted)).
206. Bank of The United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904, 906 (1824). The Supreme Court bolstered its analysis promoting the restrictive
immunity which the Tate Letter had just espoused by referring to Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Planter's Bank of Georgia. See Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695-96.
The Planter's Bank analysis was also brought to Congress's attention during the hear-
ings prior to enactment of the FSIA. See States Hearings, supra note 1, at 30.
207. See Edward M. Graham & Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States 2 (2d ed. 1991).
By the end of 1989 foreign-owned firms controlled a little less than 4 percent
of the US economy as a whole and, depending on the measure used, be-
tween 10 percent and 17 percent of the manufacturing sector; by 1990 for-
eign firms controlled some 14 percent to 21 percent of the US banking
industry .... These numbers represent increases of about 200 percent for the
US economy as a whole and about 150 percent for both the manufacturing
and the banking sectors since the mid-1970s .... Thus, the foreign role in the
US economy has indeed grown rapidly and is fairly substantial.
Id. During the time the restrictive theory was first proposed in the Tate Letter and
the enactment of the FSIA, foreign direct investment had likewise grown substan-
tially. See Earl H. Fry, Financial Invasion of the U.S.A. 2 (1980) (showing an increase
in foreign direct investment from $4.6 billion in 1954 to $33.7 billion in 1977). Be-
cause increase in commerce was an important reason for the change in policy con-
cerning sovereign immunity, likewise the dramatic growth of foreign investment in
the past two decades demands a reevaluation of the policies behind head-of-state
immunity.
208. See Graham & Krugman, supra note 207, at 159.
A headline making foreign investor, Prince Alwaleed, a member of the Royal Fam-
ily of Saudi Arabia, has substantial investments in the United States. See John Ros-
sant, The Prince, Bus. Wk., Sept. 25, 1995, at 88, 92 (detailing in a cover story that the
Prince's North American empire includes a 9.9% stake in Citicorp, 50% of Fairmont,
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commercial transactions in the United States will undoubtedly con-
tinue, this immunity will continue to be invoked. °9
Moreover, restricting immunity will lend more certainty to the deal-
ings of American individuals and businesses involved in commercial
transactions with foreign heads-of-state. °10 American business part-
ners will be assured of a judicial resolution of any dispute that may
arise and that the dispute will not be artificially raised to the level of a
political brouhaha. When the State Department advocated the enact-
ment of the FSIA, it was concerned about the commercial uncertainty
and unfairness involved in the existing system.2 '
A statutory resolution of head-of-state immunity will also provide
an element of fairness for both heads-of-state and Americans who
transact with them. Clear statutory authority will forewarn foreign
heads-of-state that entering into commercial transactions in the
United States will expose them to the jurisdiction of the United States
courts. Shielding heads-of-state behind the cloak of immunity is un-
fair and unjust for those business people with legitimate commercial
disputes.212
Both courts213 and commentators have speculated that head-of-
state immunity requires special discretion to implement.2 14 A head-
50% of the Plaza Hotel, 26.6% of the Four Seasons Hotel, and 11% of Saks Fifth
Avenue). Prince Alwaleed maintains a keen interest in further investment in the
United States and has dropped hints about entering the U.S. broadcasting market. See
id. at 98.
209. See Rebecca Mead, To Di For, N.Y. Mag., Feb. 5, 1995, at 37. This article
presents a lighthearted portrayal of the Princess of Wales' life in New York if indeed
she moved to that city. Id. Ms. Mead based her cover story on press reports that the
Princess of Wales was shopping for apartments in Trump Tower and discussing the
possibility of moving to New York to take a job at Harper's Bazaar. Id Although
purely conjecture, such a move would provide interesting ramifications for head.of-
state immunity because the Princess of Wales could claim immunity in any suit
brought against her.
210. See Mallory, supra note 34, at 179.
211. See States Hearings, supra note 1.
[Wjhen the foreign state enters the marketplace or when it acts as a private
party, there is no justification in modem international law for allowing the
foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the agreements which it may
breach or the accidents which it may cause.
The law should not permit the foreign state to shift these everyday bur-
dens of the marketplace onto the shoulders of private parties.
Id. The State Department's concerns regarding sovereign immunity can be equally
applied to head-of-state immunity.
212. See Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 531 ("While it is true that any litigation
against an officeholder interferes to some extent with that person's discharge of the
duties of office, to shield that person behind a claim of immunity works a denial of
justice to those wronged by the officeholder and interferes with the achievement of
regulatory goals in the nation to which the activity pertains." (citation omitted)).
213. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
214. See Bom & Callcott, supra note 90, at 374-75 (asserting that any resolution of
the issue would require exercise of executive branch discretion); Callan, supra note
140, at 136 (advocating a common law framework because a "legislative determina-
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of-state sued in the United States would face embarrassment both for
himself and for his country. Other commentators, however, have
maintained that the head-of-state should be treated neither more nor
less favorably than the state itself.215 Adjudication of a commercial
claim against a sovereign state (as well as the head-of-state) does not
implicate the sovereignty of a foreign nation.216 Instead, the court re-
views the sovereign's conduct as a merchant, subject to the same laws
as other merchants. 217 With forewarning, foreign heads-of-state can
assess the risk of any potential liability from suit and act accordingly.
Some courts have already tentatively advocated applying a restric-
tive approach to head-of-state immunity.218 For example, the Second
Circuit has held that immunity may be inappropriate when the indi-
vidual is "no longer head of state and the current government is suing
him. '2 19 Although the Fourth Circuit has allowed waivers of immu-
nity, the court expressly declined to decide "whether that immunity
would have extended to unauthorized acts ... or whether it would
have been limited to official authorized acts.""2 In addition, other
courts have claimed that the head-of-state doctrine applies only to
"authorized official acts taken while the ruler is in power. "221
tion of when to impose the immunity cannot adequately address the distinct circum-
stances involved in head of state immunity cases.").
Such comments had also been made with reference to sovereign immunity before
the enactment of the FSIA. Nevertheless, the FSIA proved workable. See supra note
130.
215. See Immunity Hearings, supra note 139, at 114 (memorandum of Andreas
Lowenfeld, Professor, New York University Law School).
216. See States Hearings, supra note 1, at 26-29. The courts would need to deter-
mine on a case-by-case basis whether an act was commercial or non-commercial or
conducted by the head-of-state or the state itself. For example, Sheikh Zayed of Abu
Dhabi by tradition and historical background "owns all the land and natural resources
of the country in fee simple absolute, with no distinctions being made among the
wealth of the ruler, his family, and the nation itself." Staff of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the BCCI Affair 28 (Comm. Print
1992).
217. See States Hearings, supra note 1, at 26-29.
218. For a discussion concerning the Ninth Circuit's implementation of a restrictive
theory of head-of-state immunity under the FSIA see supra part II.B.
219. Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1048 (1987). This approach effectively constitutes a waiver of immunity by
the foreign government.
220. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
221. Id. at 1110; see also Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir.
1988) (stating that the head-of-state defense does not apply to "private or criminal
acts in violation of American law").
The courts have looked for support for the rationale of head-of-state immunity in
making these assertions. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 n.11
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (expressing "ample doubt whether head of state immunity extends to
private or criminal acts in violation of U.S. law"). The district court reserved discus-
sion on the issue but stated that "[c]riminal activities such as the narcotics trafficking
with which Defendant is charged can hardly be considered official acts or governmen-
tal duties which promote a sovereign state's interests, especially where, as here, the
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The BCCI affair presented an excellent example of the problems
caused by the current confusion in the head-of-state immunity doc-
trine. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, the head-of-state of the
Kingdom of Abu Dhabi, owned seventy-seven percent of the BCCI
when the bank was closed due to widespread fraud.m Sheikh Zayed
is the head-of-state of a pro-American Persian Gulf state and an
American ally during the Persian Gulf War.ms For his participation in
the BCCI scandal, Sheikh Zayed was sued for $1.5 billion in a civil
action brought by the trustees of an American bank owned by
BCCI. 24 When Sheikh Zayed asked for head-of-state immunity, then
House Banking Committee Chairman Henry Gonzalez called for a
hearing into the matter because "giving Zayed immunity 'would be a
mockery of our U.S. banking statutes and a terrible precedent.' "225
When State and Justice Department officials refused to attend the
hearing, "Gonzalez said he was 'disappointed' in the departments' 're-
luctance to take a public stand on this issue.' "2 The United States
government was caught in a Hobson's choice-not wanting to offend
Zayed, a friendly foreign state's leader, but needing to address the
injustice created by the fraud.227 The government was spared from
deciding the issue of Zayed's immunity because the case eventually
settled, albeit for a fraction of the original amount of damages
sought.? In such situations, a statutory interpretation by a U.S. court
activity was allegedly undertaken for the sole personal benefit of the foreign leader."
Id
222. Abu Dhabhi's Ruling Family Must Forfeit $104 Million, Wash. Post, July 31,
1992, at A10.
223. Sharon Walsh, BCCI Suit Becomes a Diplomatic Baffle: Rep. Gonzalez Dis-
putes Abu Dhabi Ruler's Immunity Claim in Case, Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 1993, at B14.
224. 1&
225. Id. at B14, B16.
226. Id. at B16.
227. See id at 314. The BCCI scandal affected the lives of thousands of ordinary
Americans who lost their jobs and/or their savings. Sharon Walsh, The Continuing
Anguish of BCCI: Two Years After Bank's Shutdown, Toll Mounts on Depositors and
Employees, Wash. Post, May 28, 1993, at B1, B8.
228. Sharon Walsh, U.S. Strikes Deal in BCCI Case Pact Frees Up $400 Million,
Gives Prosecutors Access to Key Witness, Wash. Post., Jan. 9, 1994, at Al (revealing
the $1.5 billion civil lawsuit was dropped in return for Sheikh Zayed agreeing to give
up claims for $400 million that the Royal Family had invested in the U.S. bank owned
by BCCI). Other aspects of the BCCI scandal were also settled outside of the public
eye in order to avoid unpleasant political and diplomatic ramifications. See Timothy
L. O'Brien, U.S. Regulators Likely to Crack Down on Foreign Banks After Daiwa
Scandal, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at A4. In discussing scandals involving foreign
banks in the United States, this article stated.
In 1992, National Commercial Bank, a Saudi Arabian bank with close ties to
that country's royal family, 'voluntarily liquidated' its U.S. operations after
accusations from U.S. regulators that the bank helped BCCI conceal its own-
ership and financial condition. Regulators familiar with the incident said
National Commercial was allowed to pursue a voluntary liquidation to help
keep diplomatic waters calm between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
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would doubtless have been less politically charged and fair for every-
one involved.
B. The Need for Statutory Clarification: A Proposed Amendment
Head-of-state immunity would best be implemented through a stat-
utory framework. As the previous discussion of the divergent ap-
proaches of the courts shows, the common law method has not proven
effective. Part of the problem has been that "[u]nlike foreign sover-
eign immunity, which has been codified in order to permit judicial in-
terpretation, there is no readily ascertainable standard of judicial
review" in head-of-state immunity.229 The judiciary's continued reli-
ance upon "suggestions" of immunity in head-of-state immunity cases
has resulted in the failure to create a coherent body of case law. 30
The courts, moreover, are hesitant to adjudicate in sensitive matters
relating to foreign relations."3 A statutory framework would lend
much needed certainty to this sensitive area of the law. Consequently,
courts and scholars have called for Congress either to enact a new
statute or amend the FSIA. 32
An amendment is preferable for a variety of reasons.233 Although
Congress could subsume head-of-state under the concepts of foreign
state, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign state, this linguistic ma-
nipulation could lead to more confusion. 23  To avoid such confusion,
Congress should include an additional subsection specifically to cover
229. Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207, slip op. at 6-7 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986)
(denying Marcos' request for head-of-state immunity based on precedent, stating that
"this court will not intrude on the prerogative of the executive branch").
230. See Lisa J. Damiani, Student Article, The Power of United States Courts to
Deny Former Heads of State Immunity From Jurisdiction, 18 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 355, 360
n.43 (1988).
The only consistent rule emerging from the case law method is that a State Depart-
ment "suggestion" of immunity letter will provide immunity. See supra part II.A.
"When the State Department has declined to suggest head-of-state immunity, on the
other hand, our courts have rejected such claims even when the facts were indistin-
guishable from those cases in which the State Department suggested, and courts ac-
corded, immunity." Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 531.
231. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (expres-
sing "the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing
on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's
pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere").
232. See, e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40,45 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Congress should enact-or
amend existing-legislation to make [immunity] clear"); Dellapenna, supra note 6, at
532 (suggesting either an amendment to the FSIA or for the courts to infer a deriva-
tive immunity for heads-of-state from the FSIA); Fitzpatrick, supra note 195, at 469-
70 (suggesting an amendment to the FSIA as one of several solutions).
233. See Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 532 (claiming it is the simplest solution to the
present problems of head-of-state immunity).
234. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 195, at 470 ("[A] careful legislative strategy will be
necessary to obtain a clarifying amendment to § 1603(b) of the FSIA that will actually
reduce rather than increase confusion over the extent to which individual foreign offi-
cials should enjoy immunity. .. ."). After discussing several alternatives, Ms. Fitzpat-
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heads-of-state. The FSIA should cover sovereign immunity for the
state and the head-of-state because both immunities share not only
the same historical development but also similar purposes 35 Further-
more, although enacted recently, the FSIA has been heavily litigated,
and this case law can also shed light on the issues involved in head-of-
state immunity2 3 6
The drafters of the statutory addition could look to the British State
Immunity Act for guidance?37 and explicitly limit the immunity of for-
eign heads-of-state. Such an amendment could read in part:
The Immunities and Privileges conferred by this Act apply to:
(1) the sovereign or other head-of-state in his public capacity and
(2) members of his family forming part of his household which per-
sons shall be determined by the Executive.
Similar to the proposed amendment, the British State Immunity Act
and other statutes modeled on it expressly subject foreign heads-of-
state to the restrictive theory of immunity.l In the British statute,
heads-of-state are not only included expressly within the definition of
"state," but also merit a separate definition.3 9 The British Act is thus
more specific and precise than its American counterpart. Conse-
rick decides the existing common-law approach to head-of-state immunity is
sufficient. Id.
In addition, an amendment would explicitly express Congressional wishes in a stat-
ute which has already been criticized for being convoluted. See Chisholm & Co. v.
Bank of Jam., 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1986) ("a peculiarly twisted exer-
cise in statutory draftsmanship"); Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp.
1094, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (referring to the FSIA as "remarkably obtuse" and "a
statutory skeleton").
235. See supra part I.B.
236. See generally Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1105-06 (remarking on the heavy litiga-
tion surrounding the FSIA).
237. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, §§ 14(1)(a), 20, (U.K.), reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 1123, 1127-29 (1978).
238. See id; State Immunity Act, ch. 95, §§ 2-4 (1982) (Can.), reprinted in 21 I.LM.
798, 801 (1982).
239. See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, §§ 14(1)(a), 20 (U.K.), reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 1123, 1127-29 (1978).
The first part of the British provision reads in pertinent part:
(1) The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part of this Act apply to
any foreign or commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom;
and references to a State include references to-
(a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity,
(b) the government of that State; and
(c) any department of that government, but not to any entity (hereafter
referred to as a "separate entity") which is distinct from the execu-
tive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or
being sued.
IL § 14(1)(a)-(c). The supplementary definition of head-of-state provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary modifica-
tions, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to-
(a) a sovereign or other head of State;
(b) members of his family forming part of his household; and
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quently, the British Act has achieved a greater certainty in litigation in
Britain regarding head-of-state immunity than the FSIA has achieved
in the United States.240
Additional provisions would define the scope of the immunity and
the courts' jurisdiction.2 1 As one commentator proposed: "A 'head-
of-state' should be defined as the political or ceremonial head of a
government recognized by the United States."242 For example, under
this definition, both Queen Elizabeth II, the ceremonial head-of-state,
and the Prime Minister, the political head-of-government of the
United Kingdom, would be entitled to restrictive immunity. The im-
munity should extend to the head-of-state's immediate family because
of the potential opportunity to embarrass or harass the public figure
through his or her family by instituting frivolous suits.
Head-of-state immunity would be granted if the defendant met cer-
tain statutory criteria: (1) the United States recognizes the defend-
ant's government, and (2) the act in question is an official or public
act. A process similar to the practice used in diplomatic immunity
may be used to determine who qualifies as a head-of-state.2 43 In cases
involving requests for diplomatic immunity, the executive branch has
a "Diplomatic List" containing the names and particulars of everyone
who is eligible for diplomatic immunity.2" The diplomatic list is peri-
odically updated by the Office of Protocol in the Department of
(c) his private servants, as it applies to the head of a diplomatic mission,
to members of his family forming part of his household and to his
private servants.
Id. § 20(1).
240. See Immunity Hearings, supra note 139, at 24 (testimony of Joseph W. Del-
lapenna, Professor of Law, Viflanova University).
241. For example, a further provision which prohibits the service of process on a
visiting foreign head-of-state would take care of any concerns about embarrassing
political figures or preventing them from carrying out their duties. See Dellapenna,
supra note 6, at 532.
242. Mallory, supra note 34, at 188.
243. Similar to the practice in diplomatic immunity, the executive branch should
have a definitive list of all such persons who would receive immunity if a problem
arose. Such a practice would curtail the problem of political influence determining
the people who would qualify for immunity. Even with changes of political leaders,
the positions would remain the same.
This Note suggests that only the part of the procedure involving the diplomatic list
should be a model for deciding head-of-state immunity cases under an amended
FSIA. The FSIA and the Vienna Convention are not only unrelated but also involve
two very different immunities. See Tabion v. Mufti, No. CIV.A.94-1481-A, 1995 WL
67614, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. 1995) (refusing to apply the FSIA interpretation of the term
"commercial activity" with regard to the term's use in the Vienna Convention because
of the differences between the two laws).
244. See Grant V. McClanahan, Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices,
Problems 86 (1989). Diplomatic lists which are not normally classified documents
record the name, official designation and other pertinent information for each diplo-
mat. Id.
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State."4  The U.S. government then files an affidavit with the court
indicating that the defendant is bn the diplomatic list and that the ap-
plicable rules granting immunity are set forth in the Vienna Conven-
tion.? 6 Before dismissing the case, a court may view a person being
named on the diplomatic list as only prima facie evidence of immunity
and may require supporting testimony from the foreign ministry247
A diplomatic list provides not only a convenient reference tool for
diplomats and local businesses but also evidence of diplomatic immu-
nity.2 48 Both of these advantages would translate well into the head-
of-state immunity context. The list would not only provide notice to
everyone involved but also would impart a certain amount of certainty
and fairness to grants of head-of-state immunity2 49 In addition, a
head-of-state list would be even easier to maintain because the list
would be shorter and less subject to frequent change °50
Under this proposal, the executive branch's discretion in requests
for immunity would be limited to choosing whether or not to recog-
nize a foreign government251 Although the executive branch would
inevitably continue to play a role in the way head-of-state immunity is
fashioned s2 their discretion would no longer include actually dis-
pensing the immunity itself. The courts would be the final arbiters of
immunity and would have statutory guidance and objective criteria in
making their decisions.253
245. Id. at 90. Diplomatic lists come in various forms and may be supplemented by
consular lists. Id. at 86. For an example of a diplomatic list see id. at 87-89.
246. See Foreign Governments, supra note 71, at 275.
The State Department does not file suggestions of immunity in the old sense
... We file what is essentially an affidavit by the Associate Chief of Protocol
that says the person is on our list, that they fit into this or that category of
the Vienna Convention, and those are the rules that apply.
Id. (remarks of David A. Jones, Jr.).
247. See McClanahan, supra note 244, at 86.
248. Id. at 91.
249. Although such a list is still open to manipulation as has been seen in the case
of diplomatic immunity, this system will still lend more certainty and fairness to the
process than is currently available. See supra note 139.
250. Former political leaders would qualify for immunity as well for official, public
acts committed during their tenure. For this reason, the head-of-state named on a
particular list could seek immunity, even after leaving office, for acts committed dur-
ing the time the list was operative.
251. For example, de facto rulers such as Noriega would not be encompassed by
this proposed amendment because the U.S. would not have recognized his
government.
252. For example, the State Department may continue its practice under the FSIA
of issuing amicus curiae to inform the court of its position. See Dellapenna, supra note
6, at 529. Although the courts have the discretion to weigh such political considera-
tions, determinations of head-of-state immunity will no longer be made on an ad hoc
basis because each decision must relate to the statute and previous case law.
253. See Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 532. "[Elxperience under the [FSIA has
taught us that there is room enough for the play of political concerns in determining
what acts are commercial [or private] and when they are sufficiently linked to the
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C. The Proposed Amendment in Practice
A hypothetical example will illustrate the manner in which the pro-
posed amendment to the FSIA would operate. A foreign head-of-
state, ("President") is the leader of a friendly foreign state. The State
Department has a list on which President is designated as a head-of-
state. 4
During his tenure in office, President has invested heavily in United
States real estate. He owns a large hotel which is burned to the
ground causing several casualties. The victims' families allege the ho-
tel did not meet adequate fire regulations and safety standards. The
families bring a civil suit in a United States district court.2 55 President
seeks head-of-state immunity from the court. The State Department
verifies that President is indeed a head-of-state. Although he is on the
head-of-state list, he does not qualify for immunity under the FSIA
because he is engaged in a private, commercial activity outside the
scope of his public, official duties. The district court will try the case,
subject to other jurisdictional requirements being met, on its merits.
President is involved in another case during his tenure in office. In
an ongoing border dispute, he had ordered air strikes against a neigh-
boring country killing several people. The victims' families are in the
United States and bring suit against him in a United States district
court.25 6 President seeks head-of-state immunity from the State De-
partment. The State Department again sends an affidavit to the court
indicating President is indeed a head-of-state. Applying the FSIA, the
court will dismiss the case against him because he was acting in his
official capacity as a foreign leader.257
If President were to lose his position as head-of-state of the foreign
country, the results in these cases would remain the same. He would
not be granted immunity for private or commercial acts, but would
receive immunity for public or official acts committed during his ten-
ure in office. A public or official act would not become the basis of a
viable claim simply because President is no longer in a position of
power or usefulness to the United States government.
United States that we need not fear excessive claims of jurisdiction over foreign heads
of state." Id.
254. This list is in effect prior to any incidents involving potential immunity.
255. Assume jurisdictional requirements have been met.
256. Assume jurisdictional requirements have been met.
257. President's act involved a decision regarding his country's national defense
and armed forces. This type of act has been traditionally viewed as falling within the
immunity granted to de jure imperii. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
934 (1965).
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CONCLUSION
The current state of confusion surrounding head-of-state immunity
has existed for many years. Despite common origins in customary in-
ternational law, sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-state are
now separate doctrines following the enactment of the FSIA. While
sovereign immunity for states has been governed by the FSIA, the
statute does not make any mention of heads-of-state. The courts have
approached this problem gingerly because head-of-state immunity
presents many complex issues.
In the absence of a specific reference to heads-of-state in the FSIA,
the courts have taken two different approaches. Some courts, such as
the Eastern District of New York in Aristide, have concluded that the
pre-FSIA procedure for sovereign immunity still applies to head-of-
state immunity. By following the pre-FSIA procedure, these courts
will grant immunity at the request of the State Department. On the
other hand, the Ninth Circuit, in Marcos, has concluded that the FSIA
does apply to heads-of-state. According to the Ninth Circuit, while
the FSIA does not specifically include individuals, neither does the
statute exclude them.
Consequently, the courts are divided not only about the extent to
which immunity should be granted to heads-of-state but also the
method under which a head-of-state immunity case is analyzed.
Neither complete deference to the State Department's determinations
nor a broad reading of the FSIA is the correct resolution of the prob-
lem. Under the Aristide approach, grants of immunity are highly
politicized by the intervention of the State Department. Furthermore,
the ad hoc determination of head-of-state immunity cases has stymied
the growth of a coherent body of case law. Although the Ninth Cir-
cuit is correct in restricting the availability of immunity, reading head-
of-state immunity into the FSIA as written violates both the plain lan-
guage of the statute as well as congressional intent.
This Note proposes that the best solution is an amendment to the
FSIA which would restrict immunity for heads-of-state to their public
acts, but not their private or commercial ones. By basing the judicial
determination of immunity on objective statutory criteria, executive
discretion in the realm of head-of-state immunity would be limited. A
coherent body of case law would develop in this area similar to that
which has evolved regarding sovereign immunity.
Heads-of-state should be subject to a restrictive immunity for offi-
cial or public acts committed during the head-of-state's tenure in of-
fice. The increase in international commerce and the growing
participation of heads-of-state in commercial ventures mandates pro-
tection for American business interests. A statutorily implemented
restrictive immunity would provide more certainty for American busi-
nesses that transact with foreign heads-of-state. Both Americans and
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foreign heads-of-state would receive notice about the consequences of
their actions. Moreover, restricting immunity for heads-of-state is
only fair because foreign officials who behave as businessmen should
be treated in the same manner as other market players.
The restrictive theory of immunity should also be statutorily imple-
mented. The current common law approach has failed to create a co-
herent body of case law because these decisions are made on an ad
hoc basis. Giving the courts statutory criteria and objective guidance
will limit the State Department's discretion merely to recognizing a
foreign government. Immunity decisions would no longer be deter-
mined by political pressures. An amendment to the FSIA is the best
solution because the body of case law already developed around this
statute will become available for head-of-state immunity as well. Sov-
ereign immunity for states and heads-of-state were historically the
same and, despite a short separation, still share similar rationales and
goals.
Consequently, Congress should amend the FSIA to specifically in-
clude heads-of-state within the statute. For a commercially and legally
sophisticated nation such as the United States, the present state of
uncertainty is simply untenable and short-sighted.
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